Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
During the past decade, the Army has found itself in a period of conflict that has seen a dramatic increase in equipment procurement at all levels. As a result, the accountability for and actual use of some of this newly acquired equipment has become a concern. Army units have massive amounts of equipment to account for, but some evidence indicates that commanders lack sufficient visibility to account for their assigned equipment. Poor accounting has led to both excess and losses of equipment.
This strategy research paper analyzes current problems in accountability for Army equipment. It inquires into changes in Army culture that may have adversely affected leadership, learning and training during the past decade of persistent conflict and military operations. It explores gaps in leadership and doctrine and issues with policy and regulations that have weakened accountability practices. It concludes with recommendations for better practices in the Army's accountability for its enormous holdings of equipment.
PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY -GETTING BACK TO THE BASICS! …concur with a -getting back to the basics campaign‖, but one of the challenges in getting back to the basics is that 50% or better of our formation does not know what you mean when you say we need to get back to the basics, because they have never been there! Generation (ARFORGEN) model has added a level of command complexity as units move through the deployment cycle.
2 As a result, the visibility, accountability, and in some cases that actual use of equipment within the Army's inventories has become a concern. Unit commanders have massive amounts of equipment to account for, and some evidence indicates that commanders are not doing the basics when it comes to properly accounting for their assigned equipment. 3 Poor accounting has led to both excess and losses of equipment. Our Army is only as good as its equipment and the Soldiers who use, maintain, and account for Army property. Strategically, the Army must ensure that adequate processes, procedures, education, and leadership keep
Army equipment in the best condition possible and to account for it. Only then can Army equipment serve its intended purpose of giving our Soldiers the greatest possible advantage in winning our nation's wars as we promote and seek peace.
This research paper examines the Army's confirmed and growing problem of a lack of visibility and accountability of equipment in both garrison and forward deployed locations. 4 This message clearly gave commanders and supply sergeants the latitude and leeway to ignore their stewardship roles and responsibilities. But Army leaders' initiative to establish policy on property accountability during the initial stages of the war was clearly the right thing to do − We were at war! But the way the policy was implemented has led the Army into a situation that has literally allowed mountains of excess property to pile up. In this wartime environment, visibility and accountability of Army equipment was not a priority for Army commanders. 7 In November 2005, after two-and-a-half years of wartime accountability procedures, the Army realized that while fighting a war on multiple fronts and executing transformation and restationing actions, it was beginning to have a problem with equipment visibility and property accountability. And this problem would ultimately affect readiness. Property that was no longer needed was piling up in unit areas;
personnel rotations and the wartime accountability policy eliminated the need to maintain accurate records. 8 Therefore, no one was assigned specific responsibility for excess Army equipment in this murky environment. Acknowledging this shortfall across the Army and its potential impact on readiness, an All Army Action (ALARACT) message was then issued rescinding the wartime accountability policy. 9 The ALARACT directed commanders to gain visibility and accountability of their equipment within 90 days of the date of the message in both garrison and deployed environments. This reinstatement of property accountability came just as the Army was in the beginning stages of its transformation and modernization efforts to reorganize into Brigade Combat Teams. Moreover, the ARFORGEN process was in full operation, so many units were going through RESET as they returned from deployment. 10 Americans have a high approval rating for our nation's military. 18 Americans trust that the military will do what is right and just. As the largest service, the Army has the most equipment to account for. 19 They have high expectations of its Soldiers; specifically, Americans expect our Soldiers to be good stewards of the resources entrusted to them.
The most valuable of those resources is America's National Treasure -the military service member. Americans expect that the Army will do all it can to ensure the protection of our Soldiers while in harm's way by obtaining the best equipment possible and inherently accounting for it also.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan posed a different sort of enemy on the battlefield. On this asymmetrical battlefield, the omnipresent enemy was not uniformed enemy. This enemy used irregular warfare and evasive tactics. This enemy did not engage in direct contact; instead this enemy relied on suicide bombers and roadside bombs. Accordingly, commanders began requesting items that would give them the tactical and technical advantage and ensure the protection of their Soldiers. In order to support commander's requests, approvals for equipment purchasing quickly followed.
Practically all procured equipment was newly developed and commercial off-the-shelf items. So classifying and accounting for equipment became a difficult task. At the risk of not getting Soldiers what they needed to survive and win, property accountability became an afterthought. 20 Army Regulation 735-5 and Army Regulation 710-2 are the Army's basic documents relating to equipment visibility and property accountability. These regulations establish process and procedures for accountability. The most basic and critical item in these regulations is the Commander's Supply Discipline Program (CDSP). But CDSP has been circumvented in current conflicts. 21 CSDP is exactly what it implies; a disciplined approach to maintain property accountability. Army senior leaders are well aware that effective property accountability enables the Army to make prudent use of its resources and to support flexible equipping strategies. 22 The task is how to ensure that leaders at all levels understand the basics of effective property accountability.
As a professional organization, the Army prides itself on decentralized decision making and execution. Army doctrine, policy, and regulations are established to provide single source references on how and why procedures are conducted. Then it is expected that Soldiers and leaders will execute tasks in accordance with these established guidelines. However, leaders are also given the latitude to prioritize competing requirements and make decisions that are in the best interest of the Soldier and the organization, given the situation. Still, it is through decentralized operations that responsibility and risk are managed. To be effective, leaders must be engaged at every level across the spectrum of responsibility. Therein rests a portion of the problem: Army leaders have disengaged from property accountability. This is evidenced by 87% of redeploying units going through RESET do not have accurate property book records. 23 There is no doubt that the Army is now operating in a volatile, uncertain, complex and in to restore the Army's culture of accountability. 25 The Army cannot risk failure through a lack of professional education, of complacency, or of resistance to carrying out what is required and expected. 26 When we allow our standards to slip, we begin to see trends develop over time and that affect behavior. Only through enforcing policy in a fair, judicious, and consistent manner will the Army be able to restore its culture regarding property visibility and accountability on par with other professional responsibilities. The
Army Learning Concept for 2015 describes a holistic and integrated learning environment that takes trains and educates Soldiers and leaders in an ever changing environment. 27 Learning is the end state; it is the primary purpose for training and educating. The Army's campaign on learning focuses on adaptation to the situation in order to maintain a competitive advantage. 28 Learning is done not only through leveraging technology to understand concepts but also by doing, a hands-on approach.
Too often we put student Soldiers in front of computers to learn, property accountability is a hands-on activity. With proper supervision, Soldiers execute required tasks as a matter of routine. Proper work habits are ingrained in performance. Learning is the basic building block that will help change the culture and get the Army back to where it needs to be regarding property visibility and accountability. Learning what to do, when to do it, and how to do it seems simple enough. But in an organization as large as the Army is, with its competing tasks and priorities, that at is no small task! Organizational change requires leadership from the top down.
Leader Engagement
It is inherent in a leader's responsibility to help subordinates do their jobs the best they can and to provide the necessary resources to accomplish their tasks and missions. However, more often than not, leaders do not fully understand precisely what their subordinates' jobs are. 29 Therefore, leaders tend to shy away from the details and technicalities, especially when they do not understand the task and place misguided trust in the subordinates' accomplishment of the property accountability mission. To this is hard to do -much less make time for it -but it establishes standards and defines expectations. In the long run saves time, energy, and resources.
Embrace Change
Change will happen. Senior leaders must be able to personally lead change, not just manage it. They are the agents that will make the change a success or failure.
Their enthusiasm for the change is a critical factor. Change can be driven by internal or external events or processes. Regardless of the origins of change, members of the organization must understand why it is happening and what positive results it is intended to produce. Senior leaders must lead change by communicating the reasons for it and the advantage that will occur from it.
In Leading Change, John Kotter identifies an eight-stage process to effectively guide organizations through change: 
Shape the Environment / Culture
The atmosphere of an organization and the dynamics that facilitate its interpersonal and group relationships are at the heart of the organization's culture.
Senior leaders are responsible for ensuring that the organizational culture is aligned and with their vision and purpose. 36 To achieve a healthy climate, leaders must communicate constantly and consistently throughout their organization. Their communications shape the methods and actions that reveal the organization's culture.
Messaging techniques that inform, involve, ignite, and ultimately invite organizational involvement help to ensure that expectations of the organization are understood. 37 An environment in which the culture is not understood or is not positive can undermine the organization -perhaps destroy it. People seek a measure of certainty in their lives.
Effective communications give them purpose and direction, enabling them to develop a connection with the organization which allows for growth and ultimately a sense of belonging. 38 It is through this connection to the organization that the culture is developed and anchored. Healthy organizations, bound by effective strategic communications, are adaptive and receptive to change that can be cemented into the culture.
Although leader engagement is an important factor for shaping and changing the property accountability culture, analysis of the systems and processes that direct and enable property accountability must be considered Gaps in Doctrine, Training, Manning
In the property accountability blog on Army Community Forums, many responders offered opinions on why property accountability was such a growing problem. Lack of up-to-date doctrine, lack of training, and inadequate manning were among the reoccurring explanations. 39 Again, Army Regulation 735-5 and Army
Regulation 710-2 are the basic instruments for the execution of property accountability; they clearly lay out the processes. Updates for these regulations are scheduled to be released in 2012. 40 Critics can easily blame doctrine for the problem. But unless the doctrine is actually read and followed, it is hard to make the claim that the doctrine is flawed. And, doctrine is routinely updated based on developing situations in the field.
Aside from direct leader engagement, the gaps that have truly contributed to the property accountability problem are those in the areas of training and manning during this period of protracted conflict. Below are the unit level findings as cited by the PAIE technical report.
 School-house training does not provide adequate proficiency to perform necessary property accountability procedures in a deployed environment.
 Loss of property accountability resulting from soldiers progressing to higher rank and levels of responsibilities without formal training. (On-the-job training requirements, E1 progresses to E6 with nothing more than AIT training).
 Personnel turnover during pre-deployment and/or re-deployment results in breakdowns in property accountability. Army simply needed more PBOs and that came at a cost of experience.
Another training gap opened when the Army was slow in ensuring that its junior leaders were capable of understanding and executing their property accountability mission. The Army expects a lot of its junior leaders, so it is critical that they are armed with all the tools that they need to ensure that they are successful. Schoolhouse training is required to provide the basics. But in the field at the unit level, mentorship is the where the real learning happens. Again, engaged leaders make the difference.
Best Practices
We often hear that to be good, you must have a firm grasp of the fundamentals, the basic components of whatever it is you are trying to master.  Get back to the basics of teaching, coaching and mentoring our junior leaders in all aspects of property accountability and the importance of supply discipline. 50 
Recommendations
Based on the research presented, the following four simple recommendations will help get Army property accountability back on track:
 Fully train those involved in the property accountability mission. Unless leaders and subordinates alike fully understand not only what it is they are supposed to be doing but how, property accountability it will continue to be a problem. Detailed hands on training will promote a level of understanding that will help get property accountability on track. Subordinates ask their leaders to trust that they did what they were supposed to do. However, it can be argued that leaders are verifying that trust and can offer reward for a job well done during an inspection. To recognize a job well done while ensuring that property accountability, serviceability, and cleanliness are executed demonstrates that leaders care and that work done is productive and for a purpose.
Conclusion
Property accountability is a manageable task and is essential for mission success. It can clearly be executed with proper training, appropriate manning, and engaged leadership who inspect. Strategically, Army leaders allowed weaken property accountability practices to develop, which led to excess and loss. The Army culture lost its focus on accountability and stewardship. Competing priorities required commanders to make hard choices while executing a war on multiple fronts and transforming the force. The path of least resistance was to assume that -we will account for it later‖ or -it will be thrown away or destroyed,‖ so we do not need to worry about it. We now know that is not the case. All equipment is important. Poor property accountability jeopardizes readiness.
Restoring property accountability to Army culture requires active engaged leadership. If senior leaders espouse and communicate the core values of teamwork, caring, enthusiasm, and excellence in all that they do, they will be fully prepared to deal with professional challenges. Moreover, leaders must continually develop junior leaders, must embrace change, and must exemplify ethical stewardship, and must actively shape the environment and culture. These imperatives are at the core of a senior leader's responsibility and obligation to the organization. These imperatives must be championed at every opportunity that senior leaders have as they engage the organization and those outside the organization. Through active communication, senior leaders give value and meaning to their people, who then share a sense of pride and accomplishment in service to an excellent organization. Army leaders are mandated to be responsible officers and trusted stewards of government dollars and resources, especially in this era of reduced budgets and personnel cuts. 2 The ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) model provides Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and civil authorities with a steady supply of trained and ready units that are task organized in modular expeditionary force packages and tailored to joint mission requirements. These operational requirements focus the prioritization and synchronization of institutional functions to recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, mobilize, and deploy units on a cyclic basis.
